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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Rueben D. Lehmann, pro se, appeals from the district court’s order
affirming his judgment of conviction for driving without privileges.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Lehmann was cited for driving without privileges on May 11, 2015.
(R., vol. I, p. 4.) He was found guilty following a jury trial in magistrate court.
(Trial Tr., p. 81, L. 18 – p. 82, L. 1.) Lehmann appealed to the district court,
raising a number of jurisdictional and other issues. (R., vol. I, pp. 172-79.)
The district court affirmed Lehmann’s conviction. (R., vol. II, p. 326-33.)
In doing so, it held that: 1) the magistrate had jurisdiction over Lehmann; 2) there
was substantial evidence presented at trial that Lehmann had notice that his
Oregon driver’s license was suspended; 3) Lehmann had waived his arguments
that the prosecutor and magistrate had a conflict of interest; 4) the magistrate’s
jury instructions regarding questions of law were not erroneous; 5) Idaho courts
do not have jurisdiction to review out-of-state court proceedings; and
6) Lehmann failed to properly object to, and show any prejudice arising from, the
trial transcript that was prepared. (R., vol. II, p. 328-32.)
Lehmann timely appealed from the judgement of the district court.
(R., vol. II, p. 334-43.)
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ISSUES
Lehmann has not set forth a concise statement of the issues presented on
appeal per Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(4). (See Appellant’s brief.) His brief does
have a heading that states “ISSUE is JURISDICTION.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 23
(emphasis in original).)
As best can be gathered from the Appellant’s brief, the state would phrase
the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court correctly find that the magistrate had jurisdiction over
Lehmann?

II.

Has Lehmann failed to show the district court erred in any of its remaining
legal conclusions?

2

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Correctly Found The Magistrate Had Jurisdiction Over
Lehmann
A.

Introduction
The Appellant’s brief presents a variety of jurisdictional issues on appeal.

(See, e.g., Appellant’s brief, pp. 23-28.) Lehmann appears to argue that the
magistrate, district court, and supreme court are unable to make rulings on this
case because they are “corporate” entities that have not contracted with him.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4, 24, 26.) He also appears to challenge jurisdiction based
on a contention that he “only entered tribunal by special appearance.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4, 26.) He also suggests that “Federal District Court is in
fact the correct venue” for this case, and contends that this is a civil action.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 26-27.)
Lehmann’s jurisdictional arguments fail. Application of the relevant legal
standards shows the magistrate had jurisdiction over Lehmann.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law that may be raised

at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free review.” State v.
Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
C.

The Magistrate Had Jurisdiction Over Lehmann
Subject matter jurisdiction, broadly defined, is a court’s “power to hear and

determine cases.” State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132
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(2004) (citing Boughton v. Price, 70 Idaho 243, 249, 215 P.2d 286, 289 (1950)).
It is well settled that “[t]he information, indictment, or complaint alleging an
offense was committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter
jurisdiction upon the court,” and that “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction to try a
defendant and impose a sentence is never waived.”

Id. (internal citations

omitted). As a general matter “once acquired by the court, jurisdiction continues
until extinguished by some event.” Id. (citing McHugh v. McHugh, 115 Idaho
198, 199, 766 P.2d 133, 134 (1988); Ward v. Lupinacci, 111 Idaho 40, 41,
720 P.2d 223, 224 (Ct. App 1986).)
Personal jurisdiction is the “court’s power to bring a person into its
adjudicative process.” State v. L’Abbe, 156 Idaho 317, 321, 324 P.3d 1016,
1020 (Ct. App. 2014). The state of Idaho “has personal jurisdiction over any
person who commits all or part of a crime within its territory.” I.C. § 18-202(1);
L’Abbe, 156 Idaho at 322, 324 P.3d at 1021 (citing Rogers, 140 Idaho at 228,
91 P.3d at 1132). An Idaho court hearing a criminal case “acquires personal
jurisdiction over the defendant after his or her first appearance in that case.”
L’Abbe, 156 Idaho at 322, 324 P.3d at 1021. Pursuant to the state constitutional
provision vesting judicial power in the courts, but granting the legislature the
ability to prescribe lower-court jurisdiction, the Idaho Code establishes a
magistrate court division and gives it, among other things, the power to hear
misdemeanor cases. Idaho Const. art. V, § 2; I.C. §§ 1-2201, 2208(3)(a).
The magistrate here had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction
over Lehmann. Lehmann was charged with driving without privileges in the state
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of Idaho. (R., vol. I, pp. 131-32.) Lehmann personally appeared at the pretrial
conference. (R., vol. I, pp. 112-13.) The magistrate therefore had both personal
jurisdiction over Lehmann and subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. See
Rogers, 140 Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d at 1132; L’Abbe, 156 Idaho at 322,
324 P.3d at 1021.
As noted by the district court below, many of Lehmann’s jurisdictional
challenges have already been addressed by the L’Abbe Court. Lehmann
appears to argue the Idaho courts are “corporate” bodies, and that the court
below is an “Administrative Corporate Court with no contract or evidence of
association” with him, thus lacking jurisdiction. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 24, 26,
28.) This theory was expressly addressed, and rejected, by the court in L’Abbe.
See 156 Idaho at 318-21, 324 P.3d at 1017-20.

The L’Abbe Court instead

reaffirmed that “the creation and the authority the State of Idaho has, is derived
from both the people of the state and the national government,” with judicial
power vested in the state judiciary by Idaho’s Constitution. Id. Lehmann also
argues that he only made a special appearance in this case, appearing to imply
that the magistrate had no personal jurisdiction over him. (See Appellant’s brief,
p. 25.) But the L’Abbe Court rejected a similar argument when it found “the
magistrate court acquired personal jurisdiction over L’Abbe when he appeared at
the pretrial conference.” Id. at 322, 324 P.3d at 1021. Here, Lehmann appeared
at the pretrial conference, and the magistrate therefore had personal jurisdiction
over him. (R., vol. I, pp. 112-13.)
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To the extent they can be discerned, Lehmann’s remaining jurisdictional
challenges fail.

Lehmann appears to argue that Oregon officials lacked

jurisdiction to proceed against him in the original license suspension action.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 2.) However, Idaho courts do not have jurisdiction to review
Oregon judicial proceedings. Idaho Const. art. V, § 9; I.C. § 1-204. Lehmann
also appears to argue that this is a civil action that should be heard in federal
district court. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 26-27.) These arguments, beyond being
unsupported by coherent argument or authority, fail on the merits: this appeal
stems from a state-court criminal action and Lewis County was the proper venue.
I.C.R. 19 (“Except as otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the
prosecution shall be had in the county in which the alleged offense was
committed.”)
Lehmann has failed to show that the magistrate court did not have
jurisdiction over him and over this case. The district court therefore properly
dismissed his jurisdictional claims.
II.
Lehmann’s Remaining Arguments Do Not Show Error Below
A.

Introduction
The Appellant’s brief alleges a variety of other legal errors below. These

claims appear substantially similar to those presented to the district court on
intermediate appeal. (Compare Appellant’s brief, with R., vol. II, pp. 234-79.)
Lehmann has not showed the district court erred by dismissing these claims.
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B.

Standard Of Review
This Court directly reviews the district court’s decision when the district

court acts in its intermediate appellate capacity. State v. Decker, 152 Idaho 142,
145, 267 P.3d 729, 732 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho
670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)).

This Court reviews the magistrate record “to

determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the
magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law
follow from those findings.” Id. “If those findings are so supported, and the
conclusions follow therefrom, and if the district court affirmed the magistrate’s
decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] the district court’s decision as a matter of
procedure.” Id.; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981).
C.

The District Court Correctly Found That There Was Sufficient Evidence
For The Jury To Conclude Lehmann Had Notice Of His Oregon Driver’s
License Suspension
Lehmann argued below, and appears to argue on appeal, that there was

insufficient evidence that he had notice of his Oregon driver’s license
suspension. (See, e.g., Trial Tr., p. 10, Ls. 11-21; Appellant’s brief, p. 30.)
The district court rejected this claim, noting first that the Idaho Code holds
drivers responsible for notifying the Idaho Department of Transportation of any
address change. (R., vol. II, p. 328 (citing I.C. § 49-320).) Furthermore, “[a]
person has knowledge that his license, driving privileges or permit to drive is
revoked, disqualified or suspended when,” among other things, he received oral
or written notice of the suspension, or,
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[n]otice of the suspension, disqualification or revocation of his
license, driving privileges or permit to drive was mailed by first class
mail to his address pursuant to section 49-320, Idaho Code, as
shown in the transportation department records, and he failed to
receive the notice or learn of its contents as a result of his own
unreasonable, intentional or negligent conduct or his failure to keep
the transportation department apprised of his mailing address.
I.C. § 18-8001(2). Consequently, “notification by first class mail at the address
shown on the application for a driver’s license or at the address shown on the
driver’s license or at the address given by the driver, shall constitute all the legal
notice that is required.” I.C. § 49-320.
Here, the evidence adduced at trial was that notice of the Oregon license
suspension was sent to Lehmann at “PO Box 7315” in Boise, Idaho. (Trial Tr.,
p. 53, Ls. 16-22; State’s Ex. 1.) The notice itself states it is a “REGISTER OF
SUSP/CANC/REV NOTICES/LETTER SENT BY FIRST CLASS MAIL,” and
bears a certification that it was mailed on April 10, 2014. (State’s Ex. 1, p. 3.)
The officer who cited Lehmann testified that this notice had “the same mailing
address of information that I’ve received from [Lehmann],” and testified the
notice contained “a receipt of an official letter being sent for the notice of
suspension to the residence of the said pages before.” (Trial Tr., p. 52, Ls. 1112; p. 53, Ls. 16-18.)

1

The evidence presented at trial showed that notice of the Oregon
suspension was mailed to Lehmann.

The district court accordingly correctly

concluded that “[t]he jury had substantial evidence presented from which they

1

And, as the district court noted, this is “the same address that Lehmann has
used on his pleadings.” (R., vol. II, p. 331; see, e.g., R., vol. II, p. 235.)
8

could conclude that Lehmann received notice” of the suspension. (R., vol. II,
p. 331.) Lehmann has failed to show the district court erred.
D.

The District Court Correctly Found That Lehmann Failed To Show A
Conflict Of Interest Between The Magistrate And The Prosecutor Below
Lehmann argued below, and appears to argue on appeal, that the

magistrate and the prosecutor had a conflict of interest. (See, e.g., R. vol. I,
p. 176; Appellant’s brief, p. 26.) His claim is that “overwhelming evidence
presented reveals a ‘conflict of interest’ by the way Judges and
government personnel are receiving compensation and benefits from the
revenue extorted (directly or indirectly), by revenue agents (police, clerks
and etc.) into the treasury of the corporate government.” (Appellant’s brief,
p. 26 (emphasis in original).) Lehmann states that this conflict of interest “Bars
Jurisdiction.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 26 (emphasis in original).)
The district court rejected Lehmann’s conflict-of-interest claims on
intermediate appeal, noting that “Lehmann did not support this issue with law,
authority or cogent argument, thereby waiving this issue.” (R., vol. II, p. 331
(citing Colafranceschi v. Briley, 159 Idaho 31, 355 P.3d 1261, 1265 (2015).) On
appeal, Lehmann has failed to cogently argue or otherwise show that the district
court erred in its conclusion.

He has therefore again waived these claims on

appeal, because he has failed to support his arguments with propositions of law,
argument, or authority. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970
(1996). The district court accordingly correctly dismissed Lehmann’s conflict-ofinterest claims.
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E.

The District Court Correctly Found That The Magistrate Did Not Err In
Instructing The Jury
Lehmann argued below, and appears to argue on appeal, that the

magistrate erred by not instructing the jury that they could judge “the application
of law” in reaching a verdict.

(See Appellant’s brief, p. 16 (emphasis in

original).) Lehmann’s argument on this point took the following form at trial:
[Prosecutor]: … Judge Calhoun asked this, and I apologize for the
repetition, but I think it’s an important one here. As he’s explained,
if you are selected to sit on the jury you must follow the Court’s
instructions regardless of your opinion of what the law should be.
And I just want to, by a show of hands, will everybody promise to
apply the law as the Judge instructs you?
MR. LEHMANN: Your Honor, I object to that statement. The jury
has a right to judge the law.
THE COURT: Actually, that’s not the procedure in courts of law in
the United States, Mr. Lehmann. That is an incorrect statement,
and so I’m going to overrule the objection after that.
MR. LEHMANN: It’s under —
THE COURT: Mr. Lehmann, I’ve ruled on it. You need to be quiet,
please.
(Trial Tr., p. 18, Ls. 3-19.)

Lehmann reiterates on appeal that “No fully

informed jury was allowed, only judging the facts and not the application of
law, in violation of the 7th Amendment and Supreme Court rulings.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 16 (emphasis in original).)
The district court rejected this claim, correctly noting that it directly
contradicted the Idaho Code.

(R., vol. II, p. 331.)

The applicable statute

provides that:
[A]lthough the jury have the power to find a general verdict, which
includes questions of law as well as of fact, they are bound,
10

nevertheless, to receive as law what is laid down as such by the
court.
I.C. § 19-2131; see also Carey v. State, 91 Idaho 706, 710, 429 P.2d 836, 840
(1967) (noting the “jury decides questions of fact in criminal trials”) (citing State v.
Blacksten, 86 Idaho 401, 407, 387 P.2d 467, 470 (1963)); State v. Hoagland,
39 Idaho 405, 228 P. 314, 318 (1924) (“The jury is bound by the instructions of
the court.”).
On appeal, Lehmann has failed to show the district court’s jury instruction
ruling was erroneous. The district court correctly found that the magistrate’s jury
instructions were appropriate.
F.

The District Court Correctly Rejected Lehmann’s Challenge To The
Transcript
Following Lehmann’s jury trial, after the lodging of the trial transcript on

intermediate

appeal,

TRANSCRIPT.”

Lehmann

filed

(R., vol. II, pp. 282-89.)

a

“NOTICE

OF

DISTORTION

In it, he contended that the trial

transcript “is deficient in several areas some of which have a distinct
bearing on this case.” (R., vol. II, p. 282 (emphasis in original).) Lehmann
went on to allege a series of purported errors or missing words in the settled
transcript, apparently based on a comparison of the transcript to an audio CD
recording of the trial. (See R., vol. II, pp. 209, 212-13, 283-87.)
The district court ruled on Lehmann’s notice in its Opinion affirming the
jury verdict. (R., vol. II, p. 331.)

It construed the “NOTICE OF DISTORTION

TRANSCRIPT” as an objection to the transcript, but, noted that Lehmann “did
not notice it for a hearing.” (R., vol. II, pp. 331-32.) The district court therefore
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found that per I.R.C.P. 83(o), Lehmann “lost his opportunity for the trial court to
hear the objection by not noticing it for a hearing,” and consequently, the court
had no evidence of a distorted transcript.

2

Moreover, the court found that

“Lehmann has not demonstrated how the alleged distortions prejudiced him.”
(R., vol. II, p. 332.)
Lehmann raises the transcript issue on appeal, arguing that:
Paul did not rebut Lehmann’s Evidence of Distortion in the
transcript, making all Court records unreliable. Transcript
manipulation is evidenced as part of the record. Lehmann’s
presentment by law stands as truth.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 19 (emphasis in original).)3 Lehmann also filed a “NOTICE
OF DISCREPANCY” with this Court, alleging that “[a] manipulated transcript
of jury trial has been sent to the Supreme Court,” and again alleging that
because there was no objection to the similar notice below, the suggested
changes to the transcript “have been accepted.” (Notice of Discrepancy, p. 1
(emphasis in original).)

The notice avers that a “Copy of CD enclosed on

Transcript of Jury Trial for the record into the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court,” and notes that “CD of Jury Trial is key to verifying of the

2

The court’s reference to I.R.C.P. 83(o) is misplaced. In a civil action, Rule 83(i)
provides the mechanism by which parties may challenge trial transcripts on
intermediate appeal. In a criminal action such as this one, Idaho Criminal Rule
54.9 gives the parties the ability to object to the transcript. In any event, the
language of the two sections is substantially similar, and both sections state that
such an objection shall be “heard and determined by the trial court in the same
manner as a motion.” I.C.R.P 83(i); I.C.R. 54.9.

3

Here, “Paul” appears to be a reference to the prosecutor below.
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tampering with evidence in the transcript.”

(Notice of Discrepancy, p. 2

(emphasis in original).)
Lehmann has failed to show the district court erred below. First, the court
ruled that even if Lehmann’s notice was construed as an objection to the trial
transcript, he failed to notice it up for hearing. (R., vol. II, pp. 331-32.) Per the
criminal rules, and the incorporated civil rules governing filing motions,4 parties
“must indicate on the face of the motion whether oral argument is desired,” and if
so, must also file “the notice of hearing for the motion.” I.C.R. 54.9; I.C.R. 49(c);
I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A), (D). Lehmann’s notice did not request any argument, nor
was it noticed for a hearing, at which time he could have presented evidence of
his claims.

(See R., vol. II, pp. 282-89.) In light of his failure to request a

hearing, Lehmann cannot show the district court erred by not hearing his notice.5

4

The criminal rules provide that objections to transcripts prepared for
intermediate appeal “shall be heard and determined by the trial court in the same
manner as a motion.” I.C.R. 54.9. The “manner” of filing criminal motions can
be found in Idaho Criminal Rules 47 and 49. The latter states that “[d]ocuments
required to be served”—such as motions—“shall be filed with the court.” I.C.R.
49(c). It also provides that “[d]ocuments shall be filed in the manner provided in
civil actions.” I.C.R. 49(c). Thus, objections to the record must likewise be filed
in the manner provided for by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

5

Lehmann’s substantively similar “NOTICE OF DISCREPANCY,” filed with this
Court on appeal on November 17, 2016, fails for similar reasons. To the extent
Lehmann wishes to object to the transcript on appeal, the Idaho Appellate Rules
provide that “[a]ny objection made to the reporter’s transcript or clerk’s or
agency’s record must be accompanied by a notice setting the objection for
hearing and shall be heard and determined by the district court or administrative
agency from which the appeal is taken.” (I.A.R. 29(a) (emphasis added).) Even
if one were to construe Lehmann’s appellate-level “notice” as an objection to the
record, it was not filed with the court below, nor does it appear that Lehmann
noticed any hearing on the matter. (See generally, R., vols. I – II.) As a result,
Lehmann’s “notice” was ineffective as an objection to the transcript on appeal.
13

Alternatively, even if Lehmann was not procedurally required to notice his
objection for a hearing, the court’s ruling was also based on a substantive
conclusion that “[f]urther, Lehmann has not demonstrated how the alleged
distortions prejudiced him.” (R., vol. II, p. 332.) On appeal, Lehmann has not
provided cogent argument or authority on appeal to show that this conclusion
was incorrect, because he has not shown how any of the alleged
“inconsistencies” or “manipulations” of the transcript would affect any of the
issues on appeal. (See Notice of Discrepancy.)

The district court therefore

correctly concluded that Lehmann’s notice of alleged distortions, for both
procedural and substantive reasons, should not be granted.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the
district court.
DATED this 27th day of January, 2017.

_/s/ Kale D. Gans_______
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of January, 2017, served
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by
placing the copies in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
REUBEN D. LEHMANN
P. O. BOX 7315
BOISE, ID 83707

KDG/dd

__/s/ Kale D. Gans________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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